Chasing Salvos with the “Swayback Maru”
Eighty years ago, at dawn on Friday, 26 March 1943, Rear Adm. Charles H. McMorris’s Task Group 16.6, comprising Coghlan (DD-606) in the van, flagship Richmond (CL-9), Bailey (DD-492) and Dale (DD-353), followed by newcomer Salt Lake City (CA-25), and Monaghan (DD-354), was zig zagging at 15 knots on a north to south line 180 miles due west of Attu, some 100 miles south of the nearest Komandorski Island, to intercept reinforcements to the Japanese garrisons in the Aleutian Islands when radar detected five ships due north. The closest ship was a little more than seven miles away. McMorris ordered his group, which was strung out six miles, to close on him.
In the emerging daylight, more masts appeared. McMorris had run headlong into a major Japanese unit—Fifth Fleet, Northern Force—of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, four destroyers, and two transports loaded with reinforcements for Attu. His opponent had already begun a turn southeast to engage. McMorris hoped to get a crack at the transports, which continued north and out of the way, before the range between him and the lead cruisers closed. He informed Capt. Bertram J. Rodgers, commanding heavy cruiser Salt Lake City, that he would conform to his movements. The group was still forming for battle when at 0840 the heavy cruisers Nachi, flagship of Vice Adm. Hosogaya Boshirō, and Maya opened fire at long range. Maya fired two salvos at Richmond, straddling the old light cruiser with the second, before both cruisers, as well as light cruiser Abukuma, shifted fire to Salt Lake City, the greater threat. Two minutes later Salt Lake City opened fire with her forward turrets. At nine miles range, Salt Lake City struck first, hitting Nachi with her third and fourth salvos, starting a fire that was quickly controlled.
Hosogaya maneuvered skillfully, taking full advantage of his ships’ superior speed to close the range, not only forcing McMorris to abandon any idea of attacking his transports, but also forcing him to retire southeastward. Nachi fired a spread of eight torpedoes at extreme range, but to no avail. McMorris got a break when Nachi suffered an avoidable electrical failure, temporarily silencing her guns. With her guns trained skyward, Nachi took three 8-inch hits in six minutes from Salt Lake City. One struck the mainmast, severing communications, another struck the starboard side of the bridge, killing several men and wounding many more, while the third exploded in her torpedo tube compartment, causing more casualties. Nachi hove to, so as not to mask Maya’s fire.
Maya fired steadily at the old “Swayback Maru,” the crew’s affectionate nickname for their low-freeboard treaty cruiser, and for some thirty minutes Captain Rodgers blithely zigged and zagged, chasing salvos, and managed to avoid damage. Meanwhile, light cruiser Tama departed, standing between the transports and McMorris, and eventually disappeared, while Maya and Nachi maneuvered to cut off the American group from their base. Nachi, Abukuma and the accompanying destroyers expended torpedoes in great numbers but only at long range, and none found their mark.
The gun duel between Salt Lake City and Maya lasted for more than three hours. Maya also launched eight torpedoes, all of which missed, but about thirty minutes into the action, at 0910, Rodgers’s luck ran out and a shell from Maya struck Salt Lake City’s starboard seaplane, killing two men. The aircraft was jettisoned. But Nachi was struck too. Credit in this instance likely goes to the good work of the destroyer Bailey that sent a 5-inch round improbably through a gun port into the cruiser’s forward main battery turret, starting another of several fires with which the flagship’s damage control had to fight that morning.
All Japanese ships checked fire. With Nachi smoking, McMorris maneuvered for another try at the enemy transports—the object of his group’s spending long days and nights cruising the freezing waters of the North Pacific—brought his column around and northward. At 0930, as the American line turned, Nachi’s main battery came back on line. A shell, likely from Nachi, struck the Swayback’s quarterdeck. The two heavy cruisers and four destroyers took up the pursuit once more, with both sides slugging away, Hosogaya zig zagging, trading his speed advantage to bring more guns to bear and guarding against a torpedo attack. Tama had returned, but McMorris allowed Rodgers to exit the column to chase it away. Salt Lake City fired eight salvos at Tama, and the old light cruiser was forced to retire.
As Maya and Nachi relentlessly closed the range, showering Salt Lake City with shellfire, straddling the ship, the shock of the Swayback’s own guns knocked out the hydraulic unit on the steering engine. Anticipating this problem, the crew had preemptively rigged a diesel boat engine, but the temporary fix limited the ship to rudder changes of no more than 10 degrees for the rest of the battle. Some 200 shells from one the cruisers, which used ammunition tipped with blue dye, fell within 50 yards of Salt Lake City, shrouding it in a curtain of bright blue water. More than once the group thought she was lost, but each time she emerged intact. At 1010, an 8-inch shell from Maya penetrated the main deck, passed through the ship, and exited below the waterline. McMorris deployed smoke screens starting at 1018 and used them effectively for the balance of the fight.
As 1100 approached, McMorris was pushing toward Kamchatka at a brisk 30 knots. Richmond was in the van, with Salt Lake City following 3000 yards astern. The destroyers were on the port beam and quarter making smoke. Their position was some 550 miles from Adak, but only 420 miles from the Japanese base at Paramushiro, in the Kurile Islands. Their antagonists continued to expend prodigious amounts of ammunition and numerous torpedoes with little effect, as smoke continued to frustrate their aim.
At 1103, Salt Lake City was hit for the fourth time. The hit caused the after gyro and engine rooms to flood, so much so the cruiser took on a five-degree list to port. Yet, the ship kept firing and maintained full speed until 1125, when damage to the oil manifold put the after fireroom out of commission. McMorris ordered the destroyers to attack with torpedoes, but quick work to bypass the damage and get Salt Lake City moving again prompted McMorris to cancel the order.
Time was working against Salt Lake City. At 1150, the ship’s condition worsened dramatically. Sea water in the fuel put out the burners, dropping steam pressure, so that power was lost. The old warrior drifted to a dead stop. Rodgers signaled “Speed Zero” but a shell tore a hole through the signal flag. He sent a report to McMorris by radio in the open. The enemy heavy cruisers closed on his port quarter, some 19,000 yards away, while the light cruisers held to the same distance on the starboard quarter. Enemy destroyers had already begun to launch torpedoes. Salt Lake City returned fire from her stern turrets, but she had expended 85% of her ammunition.
Behind the smoke screen, Richmond and Dale closed on Salt Lake City and prepared for the possibility of removing the crew, while Bailey, Coghlan and Monaghan reversed course and heroically charged Maya and Nachi. Though taken under enemy fire, resulting in two hits on Bailey that killed five men, before they had gone five minutes the destroyers observed the Japanese group inexplicably altering course for the west, breaking off the action. Hosogaya had snatched defeat from the jaws of victory, for which he was chastised, disgraced, and retired.
Hosogaya was low on fuel, had shot off more ammunition than Japanese doctrine permitted, and had the transports to consider. Maya had expended 75% of its ammunition. Together Nachi and Maya had fired more than 1600 rounds of 8-inch ammunition, for which they obtained a not so grand total of six hits. He was disgusted with the scout work of his own destroyers too. Only the pilot of Nachi’s lone spotter plane knew that Salt Lake City was dead in the water, but that key piece of intelligence failed to reach the flagship. Finally, when Salt Lake City fired the last of her armor-piercing rounds, which were tipped with blue dye, and switched to high explosive rounds, which plumed white, Hosogaya apparently had misinterpreted shell splashes from Salt Lake City as bomb splashes from land-based aircraft, as Japanese ships were observed to be firing their AA guns at high elevation. American air support had been promised but didn’t arrive in time to aid McMorris. Finally, though Maya and the rest of his force remained unhurt, flagship Nachi had gotten the worst of the punishment delivered by the American side. All things considered, after a day of working cautiously, getting the transports home had seemed to make the most sense. Moreover, after what it called the Battle of Attu, the Japanese navy abandoned the use of surface vessels to reinforce their Aleutian garrisons, switching instead to using submarines.
McMorris had thwarted the reinforcement mission and, though fighting a retiring action, won the battle. Historian Paul Dull, in A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), said “Admiral McMorris probably displayed more courage than judgment in his actions.” Several months later he became Adm. Chester W. Nimitz’s chief of staff. Seven men lost their lives, with Swayback and Bailey needing major repairs, but all hands agreed the outcome could have been far worse.
In the event, Salt Lake City was dead in the water for only some 4 minutes, albeit a long four minutes, when the engineers refired the boilers. Rodgers continued firing with his aft turrets until 1204, by which time the range had opened considerably. Richmond and some of the destroyers fired until 1212 when the action was broken off. McMorris made for Dutch Harbor.